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RUNNING HEAD: TAXONOMY RESOLVES THE FISHER, NEYMAN PEARSON 
CONTROVERSY 
 
Significance testing needs a taxonomy: or how the Fisher, Neyman-Pearson controversy resulted 
in the inferential tail wagging the measurement dog. 
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Abstract 
Accurate measurement and a cutoff probability with inferential statistics are not wholly 
compatible. Fisher understood this when he developed the F test to deal with measurement 
variability and to make judgments on manipulations that may be worth further study. Neyman 
and Pearson focused on modeled distributions whose parameters were highly determined and 
concluded that inferential judgments following an F test could be made with accuracy because 
the distribution parameters were determined. Neyman and Pearson’s approach in the application 
of statistical analyses using alpha and beta error rates has played a dominant role guiding 
inferential judgments, appropriately in highly determined situations and inappropriately in 
scientific exploration.  Fisher tried to explain the different situations, but, in part due to some 
obscure wording, generated a long standing dispute that currently has left the importance of 
Fisher’s p < .05 criteria not fully understood and a general endorsement of the Neyman and 
Pearson error rate approach.  Problems were compounded with power calculations based on 
effect sizes following significant results entering into exploratory science. To understand in a 
practical sense when each approach should be used, a dimension reflecting varying levels of 
certainty or knowledge of population distributions is presented.  The dimension provides a 
taxonomy of statistical situations and appropriate approaches by delineating four Zones that 
represent how well the underlying population of interest is defined ranging from exploratory 
situations to highly determined populations. 
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Significance testing needs taxonomy: or how the Fisher, Neyman-Pearson controversy resulted 
in the inferential tail wagging the measurement dog? 
 A hallmark of science is measurement and measurement is characterized by accuracy and 
precision. Probability estimates involve greater or lesser degrees of uncertainty, but statistical 
procedures associated with inferential statistics for some characterize the scientific approach in 
psychology (Babbie, 2001, p 452).  These procedures have been extensively developed and are 
influential in reporting the results of applied and behavioral studies.  Great attention has been 
paid to the correct mechanics of calculation, but somehow questions about the meaning of 
significant results following of inferential tests while discussed by many (for examples, Cohen, 
1994, Rosenthal, 1979, Sterling, 1959) have taken some time to have an impact. That impact has 
possibly arrived with the American Statistical Association’s statements on p values (Wasserstein 
and Lazar, 2016).  Such papers, at the least, prime the field to ascertain how well probability 
results reflect measurement accuracy. 
Fisher recognized that results following an inferential test are the lowest level of 
scientific inference (Box, 1978, pages 447-448).  He distinguished different situations for the 
judgment of results: 1) research involving exploratory scientific endeavors, and 2) statistics 
associated with production processes and quality control. Exploratory research involves 
inductive reasoning, and going from “consequences to causes” page 3, Fisher, 1942).  Box 
(1978, p 448) points out that statisticians looking for a single general solution and favoring 
deductive reasoning were not satisfied with Fisher’s approach. Fisher offered a variety of 
inferential approaches appropriate to some but not all problems.  This was evident in the way 
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that he classed the work of Neyman & Pearson (1933). He thought their routine mathematical 
deductive way of judging statistical results was appropriate and valuable for quality control, but 
their approach was not legitimate when it spread into exploratory science (Fisher, 1955, p 69). 
Several authors (see a review Perezgonzales, 2014) state that researchers follow a 
“hybridization” of the approaches especially regarding significance levels with some aspects of 
inferential procedures being of limited value and other aspects being impediments to progress in 
science (Branch, 2014). Fisher (1942, p 8) was insistent that the value of inferential statistics was 
tied to the logical assumptions of the context of data collection. 
 In each specific area where inferential statistics are used, a particular population 
distribution exists.  In manufacturing or quality control situations the population distribution may 
be limited and fully defined as the result of the normal processes of the factory.  For example, 
some index, such as product weight, size, color, etc. would be defined by a mean and standard 
deviation.  Differences from the population distribution can be readily specified.  Inspired by 
Neyman and Pearson (1933), who set up a model sampling regime specifying two types of error: 
Type 1 or alpha error and Type 2 or beta error, Wald and Abraham (1945) developed tests 
appropriate for manufacturing.   Type 1 error, set at  = .05, represents the probability of being 
wrong if it is concluded that a deviation larger than this threshold is considered not 
representative of the population distribution.  Type 2 error, usually set at  = .10 or .20, is the 
probability of concluding that there is no difference when one actually exists. The correctness of 
these error rates are conceptualized as “long-run” probabilities borne out through repeated testing 
afforded in sampling for quality control (Halprin & Stam, 2006). 
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 Fisher (1973) points out that the manufacturing situation contrasts with scientific 
exploration.  He states “… to identify a test of significance as used in the natural sciences with a 
test for acceptance, one of the deepest dissimilarities lies in the population …used for making 
statements of probability.(p 81)”. The true population distribution in science, at least at the outset 
of exploration, is not known, and this contrasts with a well-described Neyman and Pearson type 
of population. As a consequence with the exploratory population, one cannot with any certainty 
suggest error rates in terms of alpha (Type 1) and beta (Type 2) probabilities. In other words, a 
researcher divides a sample of the unknown larger population into groups some or one of which 
is/are treated, and in that context the most legitimate judgment is categorical, depending upon the 
probability level, in that groups are either like or unlike each other. Usually this is assessed by 
mean differences, although other distribution qualities could be relevant (Bradley, Brand & 
MacNeill, 2012, 2013; Tukey, 1977). That judgement for Fisher would be against the null 
hypothesis if the probability was p ≤ .05.  That such a treatment might work in another 
circumstance is in all likelihood reasonable and all the more reasonable as the probability gets 
smaller.  It does not, however, yield something as definite as an error rate. If one does not know 
the true population distribution, it is misleading to set error rates based on exploratory studies 
and imply they have validity.  Fisher made it clear that “… tests of significance which make a 
dichotomy between hypotheses that are discredited by the data and those that are not…” are, as 
mentioned earlier, the lowest level of scientific inference (Box, 1978, pages 447-448). 
All samples of interest are a subset of the population distribution, and of course in that 
sense the sample estimates approximate the parameters of population distribution.  As Fisher put 
it, sample values provide estimates of population parameters (Fisher, 1973, p 54).The sample, 
however, (for example a particular University class) that any researcher may select could be 
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substantially different from the more general population distribution of interest to the researcher 
to begin with. For example, Sharpe and Poets (2015) reviewed the literature noting the paucity of 
males in psychology experiments. Neyman and Pearson (1933) solved the sample - population 
difference problem by making their population distribution the very one from which they were 
sampling and resampling (Fisher, 1955). Thus, they could specify errors from their known 
population. Fisher (1973, p 81) labeled them acceptance procedures for a product. 
Fisher (1973, p 54-55) had, early in his career, introduced a fiducial approach to be 
appropriate when no other information was available.  This approach, borrowed from astronomy 
and land surveying, establishes a reference point from which measurements are made (Stigler, 
1986, p 101).  The insight was that probability statements could be calculated within the data set 
or sample at hand in just the same way that a path or acre could be measured off a fiducial point 
in land survey.  The limits, however, are two.  In land survey the scale of measurement is of the 
highest order, ratio scale (Stevens, 1946), whereas for Fisher the measurement in SD units is only 
relevant to the sample, and the categorization of mean differences is dependent on probabilities 
calculated on standard error (se) units.  Thus the SD as a representative estimate is only as good 
as the sample, and the se essentially supplies an increment that is the equivalent to a rubber ruler 
that varies with the n.  Thus, Fisher (1935) could only make categorical statements such as the 
treated half of the sample is probably not like the untreated half of the sample.  His probability 
statements based on estimates from his initial sample were not exact to the population 
parameters, but were predictive of future tests on samples of the same topic.  In fact, Fisher 
(1973) stated that “…the only populations that can be referred to in a test of significance have no 
objective reality, being the product of the statistician’s imagination…(p 81)”. In other words, the 
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researcher has no a priori knowledge of the center and shape of the imagined distribution. What 
Fisher can conclude following a significance test “…of a small P-value is that something very 
unlikely has happened or the null is false …” (Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995, p 18).   Neyman 
and Pearson believed they had defined a stable population distribution through repeated 
sampling, whereas Fisher estimated the parameters of a fundamentally undefined population 
distribution from the sample.  
The argument is that the Neyman and Pearson model does not work in science.  In 
science the population parameters are not known, and the sample values are estimates of the 
population imagined by the researcher.  For Fisher (1973) differentiating between two groups in 
a sample was valuable, but the most primitive form of measurement (p 46 …it is more primitive, 
or elemental…).  It has the status of furthering the inductive reasoning process but is not 
definitive when trying to generalize to all members of a class or population.  To make the 
difference less abstract, consider the research concerns of Fisher such as manure on crops, or the 
deterioration of food in storage (Fisher, 1973, p 79).  With data, he could not say a program of 
manure would be exactly as successful in a following year, but depending on the probability 
levels, he could make a reasoned statement that this program is worth doing the following year.  
With more research he could decide to look at different varieties of a crop, but until the 
population is completely defined only probabilities, not error rates, can be reported. Fisher 
(1973, 112-113) noted that a research scientist was dealing with inductive reasoning “…to 
improve our understanding of the systems from which these observations are drawn”.  Fisher 
(1955, p 69) repeated this in an article on scientific induction as a major advantage to his and 
Gosset’s approach (Student, 1908) in the introductory paragraph. Once the population 
distribution is fully identified and specified then it is possible to apply the deductive approach 
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favored by Neyman and Pearson (1933) with error rates (5% chance of Type 1 and a 10% or 
20% chance of Type 2 error). Until then, however, the control sample is unspecified in its 
approximation to the population distribution, and a specification of Neyman and Pearson errors 
at this stage would refer only to the difference between the control and manipulated sample(s).  
Error rates imply accuracy and precision that is unwarranted if someone applied the results to 
another group from a different but as yet unknown sector of the population.  With Fisher’s (1973, 
p128) recommendation the report is of a result improbable by chance exactly between the groups 
sampled and tested and in the early stages of research no more than that. Another researcher may 
get a smaller or larger p, and over replications the extent of the difference and the likelihood of 
that difference becomes known, maybe to the point with many samples where the Neyman and 
Pearson’s approach applies.  By then, Fisher (1973, p 80-81) would classify this as a use of 
statistics valuable as “acceptance procedures” but not for scientific exploration.  
 In general, Fisher (1973, pages 80-81) described the difference between situations 
(acceptance procedures) where an error approach referencing a known population distribution is 
appropriate and where a probability approach identifying a difference between two distributions 
is appropriate. This distinction anticipates a classification such that statistical approaches can be 
placed on a dimension.  This dimension classifies broad areas in which a researcher could make 
a case for adopting particular form of judgment, error versus probability, appropriate for her/his 
investigation.  It is argued that an approach that differentiates various areas under study resolves 
much of the controversy between Fisher and Neyman-Pearson.  There are a variety of situations 
in which probabilities are appropriate, but the choice of judging the meaning of the resultant 
probabilities depends on what the researcher is examining.  
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 Fisher (1973, p 61) favored reporting exact p values that were calculated from specific 
data sets being analyzed. He suggested distributions differed from each other when the 
probability was less than .10 or .05 and became more confident that the distributions differed 
with a lower p value such as .01 with the provision that “…no scientific worker has a fixed 
level… (p 45)” for rejection.  At higher levels of probability, he would simply withhold 
judgment regarding whether the experimental variable failed to have an effect since “the null 
hypothesis is never proved or established, but possibly disproved…” (Fisher, 1942, p 16).  
Neyman and Pearson (1933) saw Fisher’s “no judgment possible” with regards to supporting the 
null as unnecessarily limited.   
  Neyman and Pearson (1933) did not advocate reporting exact probabilities. Rather, they 
suggested that that once the .05 level is crossed a decision to reject the null hypothesis will be 
erroneous only one time in twenty. “In making decisions (a) or (b) we shall sometimes be in 
error, for problems are rarely presented in such a form that we can discriminate with certainty 
between the true and the false hypothesis. These errors will be of two kinds: (I) we reject Ho 
when it is true, (II) we accept Ho when some alternative Hi is true. The problem before us is to 
consider how these errors may be.  In a reciprocal fashion, if the beta error rate is low, .10 or 
less, then the acceptance of the null hypothesis through a failure to find significance would result 
in an error only 1 in ten times” (page 493). 
 In sum inferential statistics can be used either for monitoring or for research, but which 
depends upon whether the results are judged by error rates or probabilities. A researcher can 
reason from probability judgements as to whether there is enough evidence to pursue a 
phenomenon of potential interest and are not designed for accurate and precise measurement 
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(Fisher, 1955, p 73).  A small probability simply says that two or more samples differ to such a 
degree that one or more samples is/are not like the reference sample.  Any particular effect size 
calculated to reflect differences between the distributions could be accurate, but in general the 
average calculation of a set of effect sizes following inferential statistics will not be accurate if 
power is less than an impossible 100% with the standard criterion of p ≤ .05 applied as a cutoff 
value.  Accuracy is the closeness of a measured result to the true underlying value and to the 
degree that a significant result is inaccurate effect size measures will be inaccurate through 
exaggeration. 
 Precision or imprecision is a little more difficult to gauge.  Underpowered studies, if 
published under .05 alpha constraints, inherently produce inaccurate estimates if effect sizes are 
calculated (for examples of discussion, Bakan 1966, Brand, Bradley, Best, and Stoica, 2008, 
Cohen, 1994, Gigerenzer, 1993, Kline, 2013). Even under the best of circumstances (90% power, 
a normal distribution), Bradley and Brand (2016) showed with Monte Carlo results that the 
probability estimates from inferential statistics are 6% larger than the actual value tested.  
Further and pertinent to precision, these estimates would probabilistically be around the .05 level 
and could appear deceptively precise if the studies had approximately the same sample size. Of 
course, if there were a variety sample sizes in underpowered studies, the estimates would vary. 
Currently the publication manual of the American Psychological Association helps remedy this 
problem by suggesting the calculation of effect sizes and CIs associated with non-significant 
results (APA manual 6th ed, 2010, p 33).  There has been a definitive change as the 4th edition 
only encouraged effect size reporting, and the 5th edition indicted that a fuller understanding of 
the results would be conveyed if the effect sizes were reported (APA manual 4th & 5th eds, 1999, 
2002). If the suggestions of the 6th edition are followed, which include even non-significant 
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effect size reporting, the CIs would be more legitimate reflections of the set of effect sizes.  If, 
however, the bias towards focusing on effect sizes calculated after significance remains, then the 
CIs for generally underpowered studies would be particularly distorted if the sample sizes in the 
set of studies varied substantially (Bradley & Stoica, 2004, Brand & Bradley, 2016).  Of course 
once the probability screening criteria is dropped, it is no longer inference but becomes 
measurement. 
Fisher saw inferential tests and particularly the F test as useful but the most rudimentary 
of measurement tools (Box, 1978, pages 447-448).  .  They simply allowed the basic judgment of 
whether a new sample conformed to or deviated from the reference or null distribution.  He and 
any researcher could state this in probability terms, as had been done previously by others using 
the term probable error (Cowles, & Davis, 1982). Initially, he was fairly casual about the famous 
p ≤ .05 level.  In fact, he said that those who insisted on the .05 level did not know statistics:  
“…significance… is more primitive, or elemental than, and does not justify, any exact 
probability statement about the proposition (Fisher, 1973, p 46).”  The quote is key to the 
controversy, because Neyman and Pearson (1933) were making exact statements.   Fisher 
entertained a variety of potential significance levels depending upon the experimental 
circumstance, sample sizes, and distribution moments. He gave prominence to the .05 level, but 
it was mentioned in the context where .10 could be of interest depending on the circumstance.  
He did balance his thoughts by mentioning p < .01 as a hard criteria to meet and strongly 
suggestive of support for a phenomenon, and then came back to .05 as worthwhile to promote 
further investigation. Perhaps Fisher succinctly phrased it with “…no scientific worker has a 
fixed level of significance at which from year to year, and in all circumstances, he rejects 
hypotheses; he rather gives his mind to each particular case in the light of the evidence and his 
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ideals.” (Fisher, 1973, p 45).   In specific regards to non-significance Fisher (1955) said, “The 
deviation is in the direction expected…and to this extent my suspicion has been confirmed…the 
data available….is not … sufficient to demonstrate their reality.” p73). As an area is known then 
“…a properly designed experiment rarely fails to give this level of significance…” (Fisher 1926, 
p 504, original author emphasis). It is notable that Fisher wanted the exact level of p reported for 
each replication attempt, assuming a somewhat consistent and reasonable sample size for each 
experiment, and by reasonable we mean a sample size likely to yield statistically significance 
results. Fisher’s views are harmonious with current APA (2010) recommendations. 
 In 1935 Neyman orally presented a paper with Fisher in the audience meant to “…rectify 
the deficiencies of Fisher’s thought” (Box, 1978, p263).  Fisher (1955) said that Neyman “denies 
the existence of inductive reasoning” (p 74) and thought in terms of deductive reasoning.  He 
with Pearson meant to sharpen the accuracy of Fisher’s technique by considering situations 
where the populations of interest were limited and could be specified with exactitude. As 
mentioned Wald and Abrahamson (1945) applied the reasoning to quality control situations 
where inputs can be standardized and controlled.  A context such as that comes pretty close to 
meeting scientific criteria for measurement. Thus, Neyman and Pearson’s approach has been 
appropriately applied to production lines, because the production process determines with 
exactitude the input, and the physical or qualitative aspects of the final product can be specified 
in measureable terms (Lenhard, 2006).  In addition, production processes involve reiteration or 
multiple opportunities for replication.  With such knowledge, a sampling routine with 
probabilistic expectations of finding deviations from the expected product can be set up.  The 
issue in this context is to discover a sample size that could in turn discover deviations with only a 
5% chance that any particular deviation of that magnitude did not represent some problem with 
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the production process and an 80% or 90% chance of discovering the deviation that reflected the 
problem.  Of course, these values represent alpha or Type 1 error rates and the 10% or 20% 
(power, 100% - 90% or 80%) reflects the beta or Type 2 error rate. With several tests a number 
reflecting “normal” production processes deviations from normal could be derived such that a 
decision to 1) continue or 2) check the process could be made. A production process involves a 
well determined model with known properties.   It is an appropriate application of technology. It 
is not the generation of new facts or “an intelligent attempt to understand the experimental 
situation.” (Fisher, 1955, p77, original author emphasis).  The reason it is not “exploratory 
science” is that Neyman and Pearson’s distribution is limited to a distribution that can be 
completely known.  Importantly, that distribution does not pertain to all distributions of that type, 
because if, for example, a new manufacturing process were set up a new distribution associated 
with indices of the product would have to be explored.  
 The Neyman and Pearson approach of specification of Type 1 and Type 2 error rates can 
be done legitimately if virtually all aspects of the data gathering situation are determined. What 
Neyman and Pearson are really assuming is that a priori they know all about or enough about the 
reference distribution that they can, with small probabilities of error, suggest when a measured 
distribution deviates from or remains within the parameters of that distribution.  In such 
circumstances, inferential statistics may become unnecessary and tolerance numbers derived 
from exact estimates of effect size may indicate the soundness of a process. For example, if a 
product should have a certain weight, a certain number of deviations from that weight may 
reflect a production problem. 
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 When the population distribution from which the sample is drawn are unknown it is not 
possible to specify population probabilities as error rates.  Fisher (1973) put it clearly many times 
“…the evidence available concerns one population only, and tells us nothing more of the parent 
population that might lie behind it…(1973, p 124, for example)”  The model of the reference 
distribution only emerges after the data has been collected, and it is only possible to infer if a 
difference between the reference distribution and a particular comparison distribution is 
improbable enough to make the pursuit of further investigation potentially worthwhile.  David 
and Edwards (2001, p 188) also stated Fisher’s notion clearly “…a probability statement about a 
parameter based on a fiducial distribution has the same inductive content as if the parameter had 
been drawn at random from a conventional probability distribution of identical form…”   What 
makes the Neyman-Pearson testing situation so different is the assumption that the distribution 
sampled from is always the same known distribution, which is true in the context of product 
testing, but specifically not in exploratory situations. Fisher’s problem was how to make 
“…inferences from the particular to general…” from variable data (Box, 1978, p 447).  He was 
unsettled that advocates of the Neyman and Pearson approach did not seem to make a distinction 
between technical measurement and scientific exploration.  If a distribution is defined 
beforehand “Nothing essentially new can be discovered…” (Fisher, 1973, p 112).  This was 
unsettling because in his early surmise of his contribution Fisher (1922, p323) had noted “…the 
number and variety of the new results the method discloses…”).  
Fisher’s choice of words to describe his points could result in problems. He used 
“imaginary” and “fiduciary”. “Imaginary” referred to the underlying population that the 
researcher had in mind for generalization (Fisher, 1955, p71). A researcher can only sample from 
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the population in mind with the particular portion of the population at hand. This leads to 
“fiduciary” probabilities or probabilities in reference to the sample being analyzed (Fisher, 
1935). A researcher does not have an entire defined population.  She/he has only a particular part 
of the population to sample from, in Fisher’s case, a particular wheat field in England. The 
estimates from the sample serve as reference or fiducial points and may or may not adequately 
generalize to the “imagined” population (all wheat fields in England, the world?).  An 
experiment is an instance to be generalized, but “The governing characteristic of inductive 
reasoning is that it is always used to arrive at statements of uncertainty… (Fisher 1973, p113). 
Fisher could agree that the generalization may be reasonable depending on a p value following a 
manipulation, but Fisher would never agree that error probabilities had been legitimately 
specified with respect to the abstract population to which a researcher “imagined” the results 
pertained. 
 Fisher tried to explain the difference between his approach and that of Neyman and 
Pearson.  P values are not error rates, rather they indicate the probability that data after a 
treatment are like data from an untreated sample.  The smaller the p the more likely the treated 
sample is different than the untreated or null sample.  Fisher (1973, p81) made it clear that 
identifying significance testing in science with an acceptance test in production fails to recognize 
the deep dissimilarity “…in the population, or reference set, available for making statements of 
probability …”.   Fisher complained that Neyman and Pearson had been insulated from natural 
science (Fisher, 1955, p 70), and thus they failed to understand the tentative or exploratory nature 
of the few samples obtained in any given area.   
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 Perezgonzales (2014) is one of many who have noted that there is a danger in using a 
hybrid conception of inferential statistical testing.  There are problems, Perezgonzales noted, if 
probabilities are treated as error rates: effect sizes are calculated, confidence intervals reported, 
and power is calculated all from a small set or even a singular exploratory study. All of these 
practices can only be justified on the bases of positing a stable reference distribution and cannot 
be justified on the basis of a “fiduciary” or a benchmark reference distribution. Brand, Bradley, 
Best, and Stoica, (2008) reported that exaggerated results may be published. Improbable 
significant findings represent some of the literature, whereas the unpublished failures comprise 
the now famous/infamous “file drawer” (Rosenthal, 1979). 
 Publishing practice in psychology as recommended by American Psychological 
Association (APA) manuals from the 1940s until the 1990ties directed researchers to indicate 
significance at the .05, .01, or .001 level without discussing whether these values were error rates 
or probabilities.  Following Fisher’s probability model a researcher would report an exact 
probability with the implication that smaller probabilities are better.  Fisher was not stating that 
he “knew” all the characteristics of the reference distribution.  Rather the sample was merely a 
sample that more or less approximated the population distribution, and, as such, it would be 
inappropriate to calculate an effect size if the inferential test is underpowered and involves a 
“fiduciary” or “convenient benchmark” distribution. Following the practice of reporting effect 
sizes in such circumstances, results in unstable (imprecise) estimates that are likely to be 
exaggerations (inaccurate) in the published literature.  
 The APA manual (2010) suggests reporting Confidence Intervals (CIs). CI calculations 
involve an inferential approach since the calculation of CIs is based on the standard error.  Thus 
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NHST and CIs depend upon the sample size in any particular area, and since sample sizes can 
vary, it is analogous to using an elastic band as a ruler. Thus, significance comes and goes, and 
worse, in some areas the only calculations of effect sizes may come from misestimates of mean 
differences, variability, or a combination of both.  An additional problem is that confidence 
intervals are often huge and exceed the magnitude of the effect size they are meant to bracket 
(Brand and Bradley, 2016).  This results in a peculiar problem.  If replication involves obtaining 
a value less than alpha, it is difficult to obtain results.  If replication involves fitting in the 
confidence interval, it is difficult to fail to replicate (Brand & Bradley, 2016).   
 The Fisher, Neyman and Pearson controversy can be portrayed as part of a larger 
dimension of probability testing.  This dimension includes classical probability, well defined 
distributions, and exploratory science.  Between exploratory science and well defined 
distributions there is a transition zone where shared characteristics of both exploration and 
knowledge co-exist. The dimension is multifaceted ranging from substantial but not perfect 
certainty to great uncertainty; deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning; described probabilities 
to estimated probabilities.   Zone 1, or the approximate certainty end of the dimension, is 
characterized by classical probability; Zone 2 is best related to technological processes; Zone 3 is 
a middle ground with some but not complete knowledge; and Zone 4 involves exploratory 
science.   Zone 3 follows Hulbert and Lombardi (2009). In this middle ground, researchers have 
some knowledge but they do not know the exact size of an effect or whether they have an 
adequately sized population to test an effect.  In such cases, a researcher could allow a more 
liberal p value to continue work or to entice others to contribute more data. Bradley and Brand 
(2013) published a set of tables with small, medium and large effects, varying levels of power, 
and varying Ns to show the alpha level that is expected given those parameters.  If the theory is 
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dealing primarily with an established effect, but there are other potential effects of interest, then 
more liberal alphas levels could allow the entry of this less conclusive but possibly important 
subsidiary data into a field. We should point that other fields are working along similar lines.  
Mudge, Baker, Edge, and Houlahan (2012) combined Type 1 and Type 2 error rates to arrive at 
an optimal alpha both retrospectively for completed studies and prospectively for “to be 
conducted” work.   If either or both of these approaches become widely accepted, they will 
reduce the volume of studies in the “file drawer” and increase the availability of more accurate 
effect size estimates.  In addition, it can be argued that both Fisher and Neyman and Pearson had 
a nascent appreciation of this middle ground we call Zone 3.  Neyman and Pearson clearly 
indicated that at times avoiding a type 2 error was more important than guarding against a type 1 
error.  Fisher suggested that “sometimes” depending on the subject and context a more liberal 
alpha probability indicating a difference was acceptable.   
 With a dimension and zones a user of inferential statistics can identify which zone they 
are working in. If you can control production processes to the point that you control even the 
materials fed into the process, you are working in the Neyman-Pearson area or Zone 2.  You may 
design such a stable production process that a criteria set by a particular number of errors may 
obviate the need for statistical testing.  This is because the characteristics of the reference 
distribution are controlled entirely by the process.  For deductive reasoning, an error-based 
decision is valuable in this context.  If the quality assessment is within a certain range, then it is 
reasonable to continue on producing.  If it is out of the range, the “behavior’ would be to shut 
production down with a 5% chance of error.  Such decisions can only be achieved if the 
population distribution is thoroughly known, as it would be in a particular factory with a 
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particular product.  Fisher (1955, p 69) himself recognized the value of “acceptance” procedures 
reflecting upon his air travel, but he rejected these same procedures for science. 
 If you don’t have much knowledge or only a hypothesis as to what the input or outcome 
of a study will be you are at the Fisher extreme or Zone 4.  The key is that not only do you not 
control the population distribution you do not even have much knowledge about its 
characteristics.  As such, you can take samples from it, and these samples, of course, are part of 
the larger population, but it is not known which part. These samples, of course, converge on an 
actual population distribution, but they only represent that distribution in a probabilistic way.  
Thus, the local population distribution is likely the one that is convenient but not necessarily 
universal.  The uncertainty about distributional qualities allows the conclusion that a 
manipulation alters a sample so that it no longer looks like the unmanipulated distribution. It 
does not specify the difference in terms of the universal population distribution which may not 
exist. 
 A researcher may to move into middle ground or Zone 3 after several experiments, but 
that happens only after enough attempts to estimate parameters of a distribution are conducted. 
Once a researcher has gained enough knowledge to move into the middle zone, judgments about 
distributional characteristics should be made with more accuracy.  
From our understanding, neither Fisher’s or Neyman and Pearson’s approach fit well into 
Zone 3.  Fisher did, as mentioned, suggest a liberal p is possible to accept for investigation, but 
in the main with a multitude of potential hypotheses, his interest at the time was in pursuing 
something that was likely obvious in a probabilistic sense. We had placed Neyman and Pearson 
firmly in Zone 2 with the specification of a distribution gained through control and verified 
through reiterated samples. This procedure allows the estimation of probabilities of Type 1 and 
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Type 2 errors for making decisions about a sample, but as we argued earlier Neyman and 
Pearson encroach upon Zone 3 with the recognition that for errors sometimes “… it will be more 
important to avoid the first, in others the second” (Neyman and Pearson, 1933, p 296).  In 
general, however, they made strong statements that Type 1 errors were more problematic “…an 
error of the first kind is more important to avoid than an error of the second kind…” (Neyman, 
1950, p 265).  
 Theory and measurement are primary.  An inference (the use of inferential statistics on 
measured values) about measurement is secondary.  That inference may, in the absence of other 
information, signal something about the probability of the results, but replication with the 
admission of all legitimate attempts to replicate is the most reasonable way to establish and 
understand a finding. However, we also accept that inferential statistics can facilitate judgment if 
used properly. The dimension of “zones” to portray a model that guides researchers towards the 
correct application of inferential statistics.  
 The diagram represents four zones along a dimension of certainty, where certainty refers 
to the degree to which the inferential evaluative situation is fully defined.  The zones are not 
mutually exclusive and it would take some experience or knowledge of an area to make some 
distinctions at the borderlines. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 Zone 1 consists of classic probability.  Essentially the data is categorical and certainty is 
virtually assured in the long run.  There is, of course, some uncertainty related to improbable 
outcomes until a final outcome is achieved. 
 Zone 2 consists of Neyman and Pearson’s attempt to create a situation in which virtually 
everything about the reference distribution is known. Production is perhaps the easiest example 
since virtually every variable such as the input materials, the length of the process, the 
temperatures, and the skill of the labor is controlled.  Depending on the complexity of the 
process, inferential tests at various levels in the process reveal problems that may arise. The 
complexity of potential questions is substantial.  As mentioned, Fisher said inferential statistics 
are the most primitive form of measurement.  As more is known about the area more 
sophisticated forms of measurement can be brought to bear.  He argued that for production lines 
Neyman and Pearson were following an appropriate model, but, as we agree, that model creates 
problems for the conduct of science (Fisher, 1955, p 69). 
 Zone 3 will be discussed after zone 4 because some of the conceptual orientation comes 
from zone 4. 
Fisher described and designed statistics for Zone 4. He wanted to make a rough and ready 
distinction between those areas that were worth pursuing and those which were more ambiguous. 
Fisher developed his ideas prior to modern calculators and computers, where analyses were 
laborious. Allocating his time to various problems was a real decision.  He studied wheat, which 
could vary each year depending upon wind, rain, sun and temperature as well as soil and disease 
infestations.  Thus, his reference distribution varied, and the question is: did the comparison 
distribution also vary enough from the reference to suggest that one type of wheat was 
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superior/inferior to another?  On the one hand, he had to make a decision so he had in mind some 
criteria such as p < .05 or less, but, on the other hand, there could be circumstances in any given 
year that would allow a more liberal cutoff such as p < .10.  He advocated the use of judgment in 
making these decisions.  A researcher does not have an idea until the data are collected of the 
form of the distributions and the measure of central tendency.  Ceiling or floor effects reflected 
in skewness could be operative and be taken into account by a researcher. His idea of reporting 
exact p values reflected an attempt to gauge precision. Hubbard and Bayyarri (2003) point out 
that Fisher had a conception of the true population distribution of which he only had a sample, 
and then the question becomes whether the manipulated distribution was compatible or not with 
that null. The more the samples differ the greater the probability they will differ again even in a 
new context, and over time with consistent low p values a fact might be established. 
Zone 3 emphasizes the use of judgment depending upon what one is studying.  An 
estimate of harm potential has been a factor in clinical drug tests.  For example, Bendtsen,  Bigal,  
Cerbo, Diener, Holroyd, Lampl, Mitsikostas, Steiner and felt-Hansen (2009) suggest a great 
many factors from drug interactions, functional impairment, to toxicity that need to be monitored 
and reported numerically and possibly a liberal p value to be alert for harm.  If undiscovered in 
initial testing, they may become obvious in larger clinical samples.  If a more liberal p value 
pertained in the initial tests, a researcher could have an awareness of potential side effects. 
 Fisher argued that his samples were only a sample of the possible/hypothetical 
population. His particular wheat fields in England belong to a limited population of wheat fields.  
He wanted his data to generalize to wheat all over England.  A substantial difference between his 
reference sample and his tested sample, reflected in a lower p value, is more likely to generalize.  
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From the perspective of pre-computer or early computational aids and a limited number of 
statistical tests, it is reasonable to look for phenomena that have substantial effects.  Fisher 
recognized the unknown nature of his actual population. 
 Neyman and Pearson (1933) were correct for recognizing that Fisher’s procedures could, 
both in theory and empirically in very limited situations, model a situation in which the distance 
between means are described not only with very little chance of error but almost with exact 
specification of potential error.  They also are correct since quality testing had long ago emerged 
(Student, 1908), for the clear applicability of their error decision model. 
The current application of inferential statistics involve a hybrid model of NHST practice 
(Gigerenzer, 1993). Computing power and a massive numbers of research projects (Bradley & 
Gupta, 1997) using inferential statistics in what Gigerenzer termed a “ritualistic” manner have 
created problems for psychology.   We have no evidence that Fisher in setting low p values 
anticipated 125,000 Psychologists in North America, plus some large number of Psychologists 
around the world who also have graduate and honors students, plus professors of Business, 
Biology, Education, Pharmacology, Nursing, etc, plus all of their students. Brand, Bradley, Best 
and Stoica (2008) showed with a small effect size tested with typical sample size would be 
significant yielding a Type 1 error once in seven tests and thus have an opportunity for 
publication.  For every million researchers, roughly 140,000 papers of dubious value could be 
generated, and with a 10 to 20% percent acceptance rate as many as 28,000 papers could show 
up across the various disciplines. Our scenario only portrays a limited sample of the potential 
magnitude of the problem. Add to these erroneous findings as Gigerenzer points out, a feeling of 
confidence emanating from abuse of the Neyman and Pearson model. That is with power 
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calculations based on previous exaggerated estimates, a statistically rare (Type 1) phenomena 
seems supported.  The illusion of a supportable finding occurs because of ‘the file drawer effect 
and the number of industrious participants most of whom file away their non-significant results 
while the fewer Type 1errors are published.  A researcher, reader and editor could have false 
confidence in an apparently low probability event with seemingly adequate power to find it. 
 It is unfortunate that neither Fisher or Neyman and Pearson could anticipate the 
popularity of their methods and the mechanistic ways of application.  Fisher had mapped clearly 
two of our zones and would clearly support the use of Neyman and Pearson methods in Zone 2 
while insisting on the application of his approach in Zone 4.  Neyman and Pearson definitely 
were successful in defining Zone 2 and showed signs of thinking about Zone 3 with a more 
liberal alpha when power was not optimal. Both Fisher and Neyman and Pearson have been 
victims of their own success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   25 
 
References 
American Psychological Association. (1999). Publication manual of the American Psychological  
Association (4th ed.).  Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (2002). Publication manual of the American Psychological  
Association (5th ed.).  Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological  
Association (6th ed.).  Washington, DC: Author. 
Babbie, E. R. (2001). The practice of social research. (9th ed.) Wadsworth: Belmont Ca. 
Bakan, D. (1966). The test of significance in psychological research. Psychological Bulletin, 
66, 423–437. 
Bendtsen, L., Bigal, M. E., Cerbo, R., Diener, H. C., Holroyd, K., Lampl, C., Mitsikostas, D.D.,  
Steiner, T.J. & Tfelt-Hansen, P. (2009) Guidelines for controlled trials of drugs in  
tension-type headache: Second edition. Cephalalgia 30(1) 1–16 
Box, J. F. (1978). R. A. Fisher: the life of a scientist. John Wiley  
Bradley, M. T. & Brand, A. (2013). Alpha values as a function of sample size, effect size, and   
 power: accuracy over inference. Psychological Reports: Measures & Statistics, 112, 3, 1-  
 10. 
Bradley, M.T. & Brand, A. (2016).  Accuracy when inferential statistics are used as  
measurement tools. BMC Research Notes20169:241. DOI: 10.1186/s13104-016-2045-z 
 
Bradley, M. T., Brand, A., & MacNeill, A. L. (2012). Interpreting effect size estimates through 
 graphic analysis of raw data distributions. In Cox, P. Rodgers, P. & Plimmer, B. (Eds)
 Diagrams. 117-123. Springer-Verlag: Berlin. 
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   26 
 
Bradley, M. T., Brand A., & MacNeill, A. L. (2013, June). Effect size reporting reveals the 
 weakness Fisher believed inherent in the Neyman-Pearson approach to statistical 
 analysis. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological 
 Association. Quebec City, Quebec 
Bradley, M. T. & Gupta, R. D. (1997). Estimating the effect of the file drawer problem in meta- 
 
analysis. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 85, 719-722. 
 
Bradley, M. T. & Stoica, G. (2004). Diagnosing estimate distortion due to significance testing in  
 
literature on the detection of deception. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 98(3), 827–839. doi:  
 
10.2466/Pms.98.3.827–839 
 
Branch, M. (2014). Malignant side effects of null-hypothesis significance testing. Theory & 
 
Psychology, 24, 256-277. 
 
Brand, A., Bradley, M. T., Best, L., & Stoica, G. (2008) Accuracy of effect size estimates from  
 
 published psychological research. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 106, 645- 649. 
 
Brand, A., & Bradley, M. T. (2016) The Precision of Effect Size Estimation From Published  
 
Psychological Research Surveying Confidence Intervals. Psychological Reports 118,  
 
1 154-170. doi: 10.1177/0033294115625265 
 
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49, 997–1003. 
Cowles, M. & Davis, C. (1982). On the Origins of the .05 Level of Statistical Significance.  
 American Psychologist. 37, 5, 553-558 
David, H. A. and Edwards, A. W. F. (2001). Annotated Readings in the History of Statistics.  
 
 Springer, New York. 
 
Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the Mathematical Foundations of Theoretical Statistics. Philosophical  
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   27 
 
 Transactions of the Royal Society of London 222, 309-368. 
Fisher, R. A. (1925). Statistical methods for research workers. Oliver & Boyd: Edinburgh. 
Fisher, R. A. (1926). The arrangement of field experiments. Journal of the Ministry of 
 Agriculture, 33, 503-513. 
Fisher, R. A.  (1935). Statistical Tests. Nature, 136, 474. 
Fisher, R. A. (1942). The design of experiments. (3rd ed.) Oliver & Boyd: London. 
Fisher, R. A. (1955). Statistical methods and scientific induction.  Journal of the Royal Statistical  
  
 Society. Series B (Methodological) 17, 1, 69-78. 
 
Fisher, R. A.  (1973). Statistical methods and scientific inference. (3rd ed.) Hafner Press: New 
 York.  
Gigerenzer, G. (1993). The superego, the ego, and the id in statistical reasoning. In G. Keren, & 
 Lewis.  (Eds.), A Handbook for Data Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences:Methodological 
 Issues (pp. 311-339). Hillsdale, New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Halprin, P. F. & Stam, H. J. (2006).  Inductive inference or inductive behavior: Fisher and  
Neyman-Person approaches to statistical testing in psychological research (1940-1960).  
The American Journal of Psychology, 119, 625-653. 
Hubbard, R. & Bayarri, M. J. (2003).  Confusion over measures of evidence (p’s) versus errors 
(a) in classical statistical testing. The American Statistician, 57, 171-182. 
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   28 
 
Hurlbert, S. H. & Lombardi, C. M. (2009).  Final collapse of the Neyman-Pearson decision 
theoretic framework and the rise of the neoFisherian. Annales Zoologic Fennici, 46, 311-
349. 
H.A. Keuzenknmp, H. A, & Magnus, J.R. (1995) Journa1 of Econometrics 67, 5-24. 
Kline, R. B. (2013). Beyond significance testing: Statistics reform in the behavioral sciences 
 (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Lenhard, J. (2006). Models and Statistical Inference: The Controversy Between Fisher and 
 Neyman–Pearson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):69-91.  doi: 
 10.1093/bjps/axi152   
 Mudge, J. F., Baker, L. F. Edge, C. B., Houlahan, J. E. (2012). Setting an optimal α that 
 minimizes errors in null hypothesis significance tests. PLoS One;7:e32734 
Neyman, J. & Pearson, E. S. (1933). On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical 
 Hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical 
 and Engineering Sciences 231 (694–706): 289–337. doi:10.1098/rsta.1933.0009 
Neyman, J. (1937). Outline of a theory of statistical estimation based on the classical theory of  
probability. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 236: 333–380. 
Neyman, J. (1950).  First Course in Probability and Statistics. New York: Henry Holt. 
Perezgonzales, J. D. (2014) A reconceptualization of significance testing. Theory &  
 
 Psychology, 24: 852-859, doi:10.1177/0959354314546157 
 
Rosenthal, R. (1979). "The "File Drawer Problem" and the Tolerance for Null Results", 
 Psychological Bulletin 86 (3): 638–641, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638 
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   29 
 
Salsburg, D.  (2001) The Lady Tasting Tea: How Statistics Revolutionized Science In The 
 
 Twentieth Century Henry Holt and Co., New York. 
 
Sharp, D. & Poets, S. (2015, June) Where Are the Boys? Statistical Implications of the Absence 
 
Of Men from Psychology Participant Pools. Presented at the annual meeting of the  
 
Canadian Psychological Association. Ottawa, Ontario. 
 
Sterling, T. D. (1959), Publication decision and the possible effects drawn from tests of  
 
significance - or Vice Versa. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 54, 30-34. 
 
Stevens, S. S. (1946) On the theory of scales of measurement Science 103 (2684): 677– 
 
 680. doi:10.1126/science. 
 
Stigler, S. M. (1986) The history of statistics: The measurement of uncertainty before 1900 
 
 Belknap Press, London England. 
 
‘Student’ (1908).  The probable error of a mean. Biometrica, 6, 1-25. 
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory data analysis. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 
Wald and Abraham (1945).  Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses. Annals of Mathematical  
Statistics. 16 (2): 117–186. doi:10.1214/aoms/1177731118 
Wasserstein, R. L. & Lazar, N.  A. (2016): The ASA's statement on p-values: context, process,  
and purpose, The American Statistician, DOI: 10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fisher, Neyman and Pearson Controversy   30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zone 1   Zone 2   Zone 3              Zone 4 
 
 
Studied 
distributions 
that have been 
sampled and 
resampled such 
that error rates 
are established 
The odds are 
known and 
with the right 
process will 
reflect those 
odds  
Neo-Fisher 
with graded 
probability 
cutoffs 
depending on 
the 
experimental 
context. 
Basic science: only 
samples are 
known and those 
samples estimate 
the not exactly 
known population 
parameters. 
